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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the l 
STATE OF UTAH 
.t.~} p' 
. ; ; ·~, r~i 1 
u l~· i ,:_· ·• . - '· ,_ 
THAD L. HATCH, Administrator with 
the Will Annexed in the Matter of rk-,-S,1preme '-~m· ·- · '-
the Estate of Herbert Sheldon 
Neeshan, Deceased, and IV A M. 
NEESHAN, 
Plaintiff, and Appellant, Case No. 7974 
vs. 
GARRETT FREIGHT LINES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant, and Respondent. 
CONNIE LIETZ and 
ELDON P. LIETZ, 
Plaintiff, and Appellant, 
vs. 
GARRETT FREIGHT LINES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant, and Respondent. 
JAMES P. XENAKIS and 
JENNIE ZENAKIS, 
Plaintiff, and Appellant, 
vs. 
GARRETT FREIGHT LINES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant, and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY 
Case No. 7975 
Case No. 7976 
E. L. SCHOENHALS, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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2 
BRIEF 
Respondent is in error in claiming NEESHAN was 
driving. See transcript Volume 1, R475-4. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO POINTS 1 AND 2 
SPECIAL VERDICTS 
Respondent admits that the case was never presented 
to the jury on plaintiff's theory, and attempts to excuse the 
court by contending that a special verdict does not require 
the court to present the case to the jury on plaintiff's theory. 
The authorities do not sustain this position. 
53 AM JUR 741-Section 1070 
SPECIAL VERDICTS 
"Questions should not 0 fail to present a matter in 
issue completely." 
"Negligently driven" is the only question put to jury 
and did not present the issue of faulty brakes pulling the 
unit to the wrong side. 
53 AM JUR 7 46-Section 1077 
«All material issues must be passed upon. 0 " 
"In negligence actions where the question as to 
whether or not defendants negligence was the proxi· 
mate cause of the injury is at issue a special verdict 
failing to find such issue is fatally defective, etc. o" 
and cases cited. 
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64 c J 1119 
92--1 RIGHTS OF PARTIES AS TO SUBMISSION 
OF DIFFERENT THEORIES 
"In submitting a case on special issues each party 
is entitled to have his theory of the case and the 
facts constituting the cause of action, on the one 
hand and the matters pleaded in defense affirmative-
ly .submitted for the determination of the jury. 0 
It is IMPERATIVE upon the court to submit all 
issues made by the pleadings and evidence." and 
cases cited. 
The mere fact there was a stipulation that there be 
a special verdict to determine liability before introduction 
of evidence of damage did not waive the requirement that 
the court submit the question of liability by including all 
of plaintiffs requested instructions, which were proper, 
particularly with respect to whether or not the faulty 
brakes by excessive friction on one side drug or pulled the 
tractor to the wrong side of the highway. 
The interrogatory submitted by the court could not 
possibly permit the jury to find on the issue of whether 
the faulty brakes was the proximate cause of the tractor 
going to the wrong side, or whether there was any negli-
gence in connection with brake maintenance. Said inter-
rogatory contained the words "negligently driven." 
13 Words and Phrases 400 
"to 'drive' is defined as to compel, or urge to move 
in some manner or direction. Field v. Southern 
Surety Co. of New York, 235 N.W. 571, 573, 211 
Iowa, 1239." 
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4 
The jury were permitted to consider only one question, 
namely, whether the driver negligently drove or urged or 
compelled the tractor over the center line. The records 
show this erroneous instruction was objected and excepted 
to, and objections raised thereto in connection with the 
motion for new trial. This Appellate Court is familiar with 
the fact that the practices in the District Court are the 
same as they were in the case the bar, namely, the court 
presents the instructions to the jury and no opportunity is 
given to make exceptions thereon to the reporter or the 
court until after the jury has retired. This was done by 
both plaintiff and the defendant at R851, so defendant 
cannot complain. Nevertheless when the written instruc-
tions were handed counsel and hurriedly and partially read 
just before submission. Instruction No. 4 was so obviously 
offensive and obnoxious that there is no denial by the court 
or counsel but that appellant nevertheless without even 
being granted a hearing registered strenuous objection 
and pointed out the very things discussed in this brief 
even prior to submittal R230. Moreover, rule 51 states that 
the Appellate Court, in its discretion and in the interests 
of justice, may review the giving or failure to give an 
instruction whether objected to or excepted to or the record 
otherwise preserved. 
Instruction No. 4 was erroneous under any conceivable 
facts or circumstances. It is impossible to conceive of a 
case where the jury could find that a party "negligently 
drove" or negligently urged or compelled a vehicle across 
the center of a highway. This would not be negligence 
but an affirmative intentional act. The defendant might 
be negligent in brake maintenance causing the vehicle to 
be pulled to the wrong side, or might be negligent in 
~ 
out 
gae 
tot 
tot 
o~ 
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speed or lookout, and lose control so that his vehicle with-
out being driven or compelled or urged goes to the wrong 
side, in fact, the driver may even be using all his power 
to urge, compel or be fighting against the vehicle going 
to the wrong side and yet be negligent because of faulty 
brakes, speed or failure to keep a proper lookout, and 
resulting loss of control. 
Moreover, the jury was never instructed on what 
negligent driving embraced. They were never instructed 
that a "statute" required equal adjustment of the brakes, 
or that ngligence might embrace any one or more of the 
items included in plaintiffs requested instructions. It was 
never put to the jury which vehicle crossed the center 
line from any cause of negligence and was submitted on 
the question only of "negligently driven." 
POINT 4 
Re: TESTIMONY OF GRANT STAPLES 
48 ALR 949 
"the court holds that a trial court should not limit 
the number of witnesses of either party, on the 
only issue, or on any one of the controlling issues, 
of the suit; but on collateral matters the court may, 
and should, limit the number of witnesses, using 
discretion in so doing." 
POINT 5 
EXPERTS HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS 
20 AM JUR, 665, Section 793 
"The rule requiring the statement of hypothetical 
facts to an expert witness has no application to ques-
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tions calling for the conclusion of one who has per-
sonal knowledge of the subject of the inquiry. If 
the witness called upon to give expert testimony 
is acquainted with the facts of the case-that is, if 
he has personal knowledge or has made personal 
observation-he may give his opinion upon the basis 
of his knowledge and observation in response to 
direct interrogation." 
Franklin Harris knew more about the facts than any 
witness before the court. The authorities have better 
answered respondent than counsel is able to do. 
POINTS 6 & 12 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF SHERIFF ROBINSON 
Plaintiff and appellant was entitled to show the jury 
whether the Sheriff made any examination to determine if 
the brakes were in equal adjustment. This was proper 
where the examination of the scene as shown by the 
photographs disclosed that it was obvious the brakes were 
not in equal adjustment. It was entirely proper to inter-
rogate the Sheriff on the question of whether or not he 
lmew that the state law required equal adjustment, or was 
even familiar with the principle th~t both sides must be 
in equal adjustment. This is particularly true on cross 
examination of a witness who purportedly examined the 
scene as an officer of the law should when four people 
had been killed. 
POINT 11 
JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
Respondent complains about being blasted with a 
sawed off shot gun. Respondent is in this position of peril 
\t 
I 
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~car ~e recover on a rrouno ~)r a theory or HELY 0 
ISE which he has directly or in effect REPUI Ih.'t"t~T 
>'-'11 testimonY*'' 
by the facts in this case and has aptly described his own p: 
predicament because of the cold hard facts. 
Respondent has elaborately treated the facts of the 
case in respondent's brief. Appellant recognized the fact 
that if there was any competent evidence at all upon which 
the jury would be entitled to make a determination against 
appellant, that appellant has no right to request this court 
to grant plaintiff and appellant's motion for a directed 
verdict. Appellant's motion, however, is based upon the 
premises that there was no competent evidence submitted 
by the defendant which could constitute a defense to the 
evidence of negligence and proximate cause as submitted 
by plaintiff. 
32 c J s 1104 
1040 CONCLUSIVENESS OF EVIDENCE 
"As a general rule, a party is bound by uncontra-
dicted evidence produced by him to prove a par-
ticular fact or facts; and where he introduces a wit-
ness to testify on his behalf he ordinarily vouches 
for the credibility of his testimony, and, in the 
absence of contradictory evidence, is bound by such
1 
1/ 
testimony." (£ 
1. The testimony of defendant's three witnesses, 
Robinson, White and Sherwood, was based on the marks 
crossing the highway as seen in Exhibit F as being made 
by the Studebaker. These marks were made before any 
of the above three witnesses appeared t<.?_ ~~~~~~ the s~~~f 
See Exhibit 14, page 4, line 28.1)5efendant produced the ~ 
witness Faile and is bound by his testimony. Faile in a 
sworn statement, Exhibit 14, page 6, stated that these 
marks were not on the highway immediately after the 
-~ 
:Exhibit 14, defendant's witness sworn statement:,_,.; 
duced by defendant. See page 6. 
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th ~ ._, v '.A.\o-4 '- --..n ..... :~..., 6o _: ... ,~ t ~:e t ;er e c.ccicent L.I'C.\,1\'V'c;;<;:;.L.l v.i..l."-' 
there were no skic mo. rks on the highwo.y left by 
leb&ker tc t~~ ~r~~ directly south ~f tne seats 
·j.s." s --· 
crash but were made later by a Mercury automobile before 
Sherwood, White, or Robinson arrived at the scene, and 
were not made by the Studebaker but were made by a 
Mercury, and that the Studebaker made no marks. De-
fendant's witness, Faile, stated in a sworn statement intro-
duced by defendant R802-6: 
Exhibit 14, page 2, line 5 
"affiant did not observe these marks prior to the 
time the Mercury came." 
Exhibit 14, page 4, line 24 
"While affiant was at the wreckage a Mercury car 
came up at a terrific rate of speed threw on his 
brakes and screeched his tires on the highway, came 
to rest about where seats and debris was located 
on the highway. Affiant recalled when the Mercury 
stopped he conversed with the parties standing at 
the wreckage. 
How many sets of heavy skid marks can the court see? 
Only one. 
Who made them? According to the defendant's testi-
mony the Mercury. 
Defendant's witness Faile voluntarily and without sug-
gestion or urging and using his best judgment identified 
these marks as Mercury tire skid marks R793-19. See also 
Exhibit 00 and PP. Defendant is bound by this testimony 
and the same is conclusive. This eliminates the entire and 
only defense offered by defendant against plaintiff's case. 
There is no evidence before the court that Faile or 
any one else ever contradicted the above statements. All 
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L&er t~1~.n 
.ne- ti:Jn. 
c.: '-'· ~ Ll2 ::_, ~.., ·~) n Lcll· .:.' c L 
c· ~: ~n._)(: if i .:;( ·.) r Left by hi.::· f1n t~1e1· cross 
9 
evidence of these witnesses, White, Robinson and Sher-
wood, about these tracks is incompetent immaterial and 
has no place before the jury. The court had no right to 
permit the jury to speculate upon such incompetent evi-
dence. Counsel have failed to show where the evidence 
of Faile aforesaid was ever conb·adicted, so the rule of law ~ 
applies. This leaves defendant only with the testimony of 3 Faile, Noyes, and Someson the driver. rA.t :R731r-3l)Noyes-
says he could not see the position of the cars at impact and 
did not see impact. Faile at R781, line 9: Did you see the 
actual impact between the two vehicles, answer, No. Again 
defendant's own witness, the driver of the tractor, Mr. 
Someson stated A553-7. 
"The way the road is down there, you don't know 
whether a man is on his side of the road or not." 
Someson in his depositon, :e_age 12, line 20, also stated: 
/rS"Sf -1¥ ~ S.SH- /8' 
"Well, I realfy didn't look.~ I was actually on the 
outside of the cab before I knew anything." 
Is there any competent evidence that the tractor wa-;-p 
not on its wrong side at time of impact? The court can 
almost take judicial notice if the fact that going around 
a curve one can't tell which side of the road a car is on 
as it is approaching the curve, particularly at night, and 
where as there is no center line painted in. The exhibits 
also bear this out. See how the Studebaker in Exhibit E 
is lower than the bank and weeds on the curve and one 
couldn't even see the top of the Studebaker around the 
curve. Now if the driver who is elevated in the cab and 
in front can't tell, how can two men in a car only 50 feet 
behind this huge trailer (see R7 45-27 only 50 feet behind) 
(4) 
·s·)n vas a l ~.o a skecl ~lC>h' he me; de his 
Wbs on the wrJng SlOe. H~ st&te6: 
''we observed it <:d'tt=:>l·V-~C1rG.s ho~N he 
c tHl t I' 0 1 I I 
observations &s t 
1eposi ti·Jn 41-; .3 
~~~c l:J s t 
· s we? 0ok at Exhibit 00 ~c; F. 
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10 
see through the trailer, through the tractor and have better 
vision than the driver. There is not a member of this court 
who was not attempted to pass a unit like shown in the 
exhibit, and it is common lmowledge that you almost have 
to get entirely into the wrong lane to see around one of 
these huge box cars units. This makes the testimony of 
Noyes and Faile as not worthy for jury consideration and 
incompetent. This leaves the defense with no competent 
evidence offered in defense. In defense of what? 
I. Uncontradicted and admitted negligence in relin-
ing brakes on one side of tractor only, and in violation of 
manufacturer's published warning. 
2. Violation of the Statute 57-7-205 (7) (C) requir-
ing equal adjustment of brakes on opposite sides of the 
tractor. 
3. Uncontradicted evidence of unequal adjustment 
of brakes on opposite sides by both experts and exhibits, 
and all the evidence. 
4. Defendant's tractor actually being pulled to wrong 
side of highway and being on the wrong side of the high-
way. See all evidence and exhibits also uncontradicted 
that tractor was on wrong side. 
5. R558-15 tractor driver admitted impact knocked 
feet off brakes. There are no brakes on front wheels. Im-
pact had to be with tractor front on wrong side since rear 
duals were making brake skid marks clear beyond center 
line, and with the brakes off no rubber would have been 
laid down by the rear duals when said duals were crossing 
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over to the center of the road since the front would be 
23 feet ahead of the skid marks. No explanation was given 
how rear dual tractor skid marks got over to wrong side. 
6. Impact of the units required movement of the rear 
duals of the tractor. See R454-14 or 457-4 or 459-11. Rear 
dual movement is visible. The position of rear dual move-
ment is consistent only with th~ front of the tractor being 
on wrong side of highway. It was shown that from the 
center of the rear wheels of the tractor to the front bumper 
was 23 feet. Measuring from the jiggle marks 23 feet along 
the skid marks placed the front of the tractor on its wrong 
side of the highway, and intercepted the light marks 
identified as Studebaker tire marks. Staples and Bowman 
likewise testified that the tractor was examined and that 
when they examined the jiggle marks the distance on the 
tractor when compared on the skid marks on the road 
placed the front of the tractor on the wrong side, and the 
damage demonstrated was consistent only with impact at 
this precise angle with the tractor front on the wrong side. 
7. At R549-28, R551-16 the driver of defendant's 
tractor claimed the Studebaker was on its right-hand side 
with its right-hand wheels off on the unpaved shoulder 
when said Studebaker was 100 feet away from the tractor. 
At R569-28 the driver indicated his reflexes were normal 
The tractor was traveling 37 miles per hour. The Stude-
baker was not going any slower than 37 miles per hour. 
They were approaching each other more than 110 feet per 
second. Since the driver's reflexes were normal, how could 
the driver even get his brakes on before the impact since 
there would be more than 100 feet of traveling distance 
by the two vehicles in the normal reaction time of one 
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second the two units had to travel more than 110 feet and 
there could be no brake marks before impact. · 
8. Also items set forth in appellant's brief. 
Under the evidence before the court, particularly 
failure to reline brakes on both sides of the tractor, the 
lower court should have and was bound to have given a 
negligence per se instruction and judicial consideration in 
the administration of justice should have required the court 
to have granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
WHEREFORE appellant prays that the case be not 
only remanded and be reversed on all points submitted but 
be remanded with instructions for the jury to determine 
the damage question only under a mandate to enter a 
directed verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. L. SCHOENHALS, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
. ~l1re claim of c1efendant rerc..rdLng spee~ of ~~,1e 1S{~ 
bf.ker does not c~Jnstitute o. defense to plaJ.ntif s c--:. 
guests in the Studebaker. .· .. ore:Jver, aefenci~nt !laS nr'. 
s~l)WD by competent evi<.:tence the. t the Studebo.:cer w~:;s or. 
"'n· JD,Q' side so speed is i'!ILTTta terial. 
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dants Exhibit 14 introduced hy defendant. 
dants witness Faile in a sworn st~tement stated: 
4, line 5. 
~kt the time of the impact the tractor appeared 
to be at a 45D o.ngle '-Ti th the rJad*11 
lso R 787-30 anti R752-15 
It is impossible to put a 2~ foot tractor at a 45° 
with the road vithout completely blocking the entire 
ay. See Exhibit GG. On Exhibit G~ it shows tractor 
45° angle with tractor not only across the road but. 
soft shoulcer. Page 4, line 8: 
"After the i!llpo.ct the .tractor did not :nove over 
25 feet. t! 
It is impossible to have impact on tractor side of 
ay and only move 25 feet. Tractor itself is 25 feet 
and moved clear a.cross highway and off same. 
it 14, page 4, line 10. 
"He coula see the tractor swing out to the left 
and assumed about a 45° angle to the highvay be-
fore he heard the noise of impact. It appeared 
to be about one sec~nd in time before the tr&ctor 
turned out until the impact." 
The tractor was traveling 37 miles per hour or about 
et per second; in one sec.1nd it w.Tuld have been on 
rong siae. 
Lefendant is bound by 'this testimony of his witness 
~duced b~' him. It i. s c0ncl usi ve. 
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